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I. Introduction
Creditors who extend credit or otherwise become entitled to
payment of obligations owed by debtors have various legal rights
and expectations, mostly to collect those obligations in due
course based on agreement or operation of law. Debtors are
personally and legally obligated to pay the obligations they
incur. When debtors default with respect to payment of those
obligations, creditors generally have the right to bring a legal
cause of action against them and acquire a judgment. Failure
by the debtor to pay the judgment gives to the judgment creditor
the right to exercise various post-judgment remedies in order to
collect the judgment. This includes the attachment and
foreclosure of nonexempt property owned by the debtor.
When a debtor is married, issues arise with regard to
whether the judgment creditor can attach property owned in
whole or in part by the debtor’s spouse. There exist two separate
types of marital property regimes in the United States. The first
and most common type is the common law property system
adopted from the laws of England. In general, when only one
spouse is personally liable for an obligation, a judgment creditor
cannot attach property owned by the other spouse to satisfy the
judgment.1 Spouses in common law property jurisdictions are
treated as separate persons with regard to obligations incurred
by each individual during the marriage.2
The second type of marital property regime used by nine of
the states is the community property system, adopted from
Spanish law. In this system, marital property is characterized
as either separate property of one spouse or community
property. Separate property is treated generally as if the
spouses are single and not married.3 As a consequence, with
1. See Margaret M. Mahoney, The Equitable Distribution of Marital
Debts, 79 UMKC L. REV. 445, 449–50 (2010) (explaining that in the forty-one
common law property states, liability for unsecured debts is limited to the
spouse who incurred the debt).
2. See id. at 445 (stating that, in common law property states, spouses
retain their separate identity with regard to both debts and ownership of
assets).
3. See, e.g., Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 223 (Tex. 1982)
(stating that separate property owes its existence to things entirely unrelated
to the marriage, and the spouses are treated as strangers with regard to that
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respect to obligations for which only one spouse is personally
liable, separate property in the community property system is
treated generally the same as marital property in the common
law property system. A judgment creditor cannot attach
separate property owned by the other spouse to satisfy the
judgment.4 Community property is treated as if each spouse
owns an undivided one-half interest in such property.5 A
significant issue in the community property system is to what
extent a judgment creditor can attach community property to
satisfy a judgment for which only one spouse is personally liable.
The nine community property states have adopted a variety
of distinct rules with regard to this issue. Some jurisdictions
have adopted rules that are extremely friendly to creditors,
allowing the attachment of virtually any nonexempt community
property to satisfy a judgment for which only one spouse is
personally liable, regardless of whether the underlying debt was
incurred before or during the marriage.6 Other jurisdictions
have adopted rules that are more restrictive with regard to
creditors, preventing the attachment of certain community
property based on a variety of factors.7 Part II of this Article will
provide a review of the rules that are used in both the common
law property states and the community property states with
regard to this issue.
A much more troublesome issue has arisen in the
community property states when spouses divorce. Namely, to
what extent is a creditor allowed to obtain a post-divorce
judgment against a spouse who is not personally liable for a debt
incurred by the other spouse either before or during the
marriage, and attach nonexempt property either received by
property).
4. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.202(a) (West 2006) (providing that a
spouse’s separate property is not subject to debts for which only the other
spouse is personally liable).
5. See Mahoney, supra note 1, at 449 (explaining that, as a general rule,
each spouse owns half of all community assets).
6. See Andrea B. Carroll, The Superior Position of the Creditor in the
Community Property Regime: Has the Community Become a Mere Creditor
Collection Device?, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 7 (2007) (discussing Louisiana
law providing that separate or community obligations may be satisfied from
any community property).
7. See id. at 8–20 (comparing community property states that use a
managerial system of liability with those that use a community debt system).
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such spouse in the divorce or subsequently acquired by such
spouse. This issue has been dealt with in a variety of ways by
the nine community property states. Consistent with the first
issue discussed above involving attachment during the marriage
of property owned by the non-debtor spouse, some of the states
have adopted rules that are extremely friendly to creditors,8 and
others have adopted rules that are more restrictive.9 In some
jurisdictions, creditors acquire greater rights as a result of the
divorce than they would have if no divorce had occurred.10 Part
III of this Article will provide a review of the rules that are used
in the community property states with regard to this issue.
The primary thrust of this Article is to address the postdivorce liability issue outlined in Part III from the perspective of
debtor-creditor law. The rules adopted in most of the community
property jurisdictions with respect to this issue appear to be
primarily focused on the perspective of marital property and
family law without regard to general debtor-creditor law
principles and policies. For example, basic fraudulent transfer
law has been ignored in those jurisdictions and not applied in
the usual manner. As a result, the rules developed in those
jurisdictions with regard to the post-divorce liability issue are
not consistent with the basic principles and policies of debtorcreditor law. Part IV of this Article will discuss basic debtorcreditor law as it relates to this issue, and will propose a set of
rules which could and should be adopted by the community
property jurisdictions consistent with debtor-creditor law as it
applies generally.
II. Liability of Marital Property for Obligations for
Which Only One Spouse is Personally Liable
Personal liability for obligations is established pursuant to

8. See James R. Ratner, Creditor and Debtor Windfalls from Divorce, 3
EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 211, 214–23 (2011) (describing the law of
community property states, such as Arizona, that actually provide for windfalls
to creditors when married couples divorce).
9. See James W. Paulsen, The Unsecured Texas Creditor’s Post-Divorce
Claim to Former Community Property, 63 BAYLOR L. REV.781, 812–15 (2011)
(describing the restrictive approach used in Idaho with regard to this issue).
10. See Ratner, supra note 8, at 214–23.
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general principles of law based on the type of obligation involved.
Executing a contract can cause a person to become contractually
obligated for a debt. Committing a tort or crime may cause an
obligation to be imposed on a person in court or by a federal,
state, or local law—for example, a tax liability.
Many
possibilities exist by which a person can become liable for some
type of obligation. These rules apply in the same way to both
single and married persons, with certain exceptions.11 A
married person may be held liable for the acts of his spouse in
several situations. First, some community property states
recognize the “necessaries doctrine,” in which a spouse is held
personally liable for debts incurred by the other spouse for
necessaries, such as food, clothing, or medical care.12 In other
states, a spouse may be held liable if his or her spouse acts as
his or her agent under general agency/principal law.13 Other
legal theories sometimes used to impose liability on a spouse for
acts of the other spouse include the doctrines of ratification and
unjust enrichment.14
It is obvious that obligations incurred prior to marriage are
the sole obligation of the person incurring them. However,
obligations incurred during marriage may be the sole obligation
of only one spouse, or may be the joint obligation of both spouses.
Spouses could be jointly liable under any of the theories
discussed above, or because both spouses are jointly liable under
the applicable rule of law under which liability for the obligation
is based. For example, if both spouses execute a contract, they
are both jointly obligated with respect to it. If both spouses are
jointly personally liable for an obligation, the creditor can bring
a legal cause of action and obtain a judgment against both
spouses individually and accordingly exercise post-judgment
11. See James L. Musselman, Once Upon a Time in Bankruptcy Court:
Sorting Out Liability of Marital Property for Marital Debt Is No Fairy Tale, 41
FAM. L.Q. 249, 251 (2007) (explaining the manner in which a person could
become liable for an obligation).
12. See Carroll, supra note 6, at 20–23 (explaining the necessaries
doctrine as it has been applied in five of the community property states).
13. See id. at 23 (explaining the manner in which agency/principal law
has been applied in some states to impose liability on a spouse for acts of the
other spouse).
14. Id. at 24–25 (explaining the manner in which the doctrines of
ratification and unjust enrichment have been applied in some states to impose
liability on a spouse for acts of the other spouse).
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remedies against each of them. If only one spouse is personally
liable for an obligation, the issue is whether the judgment
creditor can attach property owned in whole or in part by the
non-liable spouse.
Generally speaking, in common law property states, when
only one spouse is personally liable for an obligation, a judgment
creditor cannot attach property owned by the other spouse to
satisfy the judgment.15 Spouses in common law property
jurisdictions are treated as separate persons with regard to
obligations incurred by only one of them during the marriage.16
The nine community property states have adopted a variety
of distinct rules with regard to this issue. All nine states are
typically categorized into one of two systems regarding marital
property liability: (1) the managerial system; or (2) the
community debt system.17
A. The Managerial System
California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, and Texas are
typically categorized under the managerial system.18 The basic
concept of a managerial system is that a creditor should be
entitled to seize any community property which a spouse
personally liable for a debt has the power to manage, and
thereby voluntarily alienate to a creditor.19 It should be noted
that the underlying goal of this concept is not entirely achieved
in any of the five states that are typically grouped in this
category.
In Texas, determining whether a judgment creditor can
attach nonexempt property owned in whole or in part by the non15. See Mahoney, supra note 1, at 449–50 (explaining that in the fortyone common law property states, liability for unsecured debts is limited to the
spouse who incurred the debt).
16. See id. at 445 (stating that in the common law property states,
spouses retain their separate identity with regard to both debts and ownership
of assets).
17. See Carroll, supra note 6, at 9–10 (describing the two basic systems
for determining marital property liability in the community property states).
18. Id. at 11 (stating that these five states are commonly categorized
under the management system of liability).
19. Id. at 11–12 (explaining the basic rationale for the managerial system
of marital property liability).
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liable spouse requires that the property first be characterized as
separate property or community property. This is because a
spouse’s separate property is not subject to liabilities incurred
solely by the other spouse.20 Whether community property is
subject to attachment by a judgment creditor for an obligation
for which only one spouse is personally liable requires a
determination of the extent to which the spouses have
management power over that particular community property.
By statute, each spouse is given the sole power to manage
community property constituting (1) that spouse’s personal
earnings; (2) revenue from that spouse’s separate property; (3)
recoveries for personal injuries of that spouse; or (4) the increase
or mutation of, or the revenue from, that spouse’s personal
earnings, revenue from separate property, or recoveries for
personal injuries.21 All other community property is subject to
the joint management and control of the spouses, unless they
agree otherwise as provided in the statute.22 If a spouse is not
personally liable for an obligation incurred solely by the other
spouse, any community property over which that non-liable
spouse has sole management and control is not subject to that
obligation if: (1) the obligation was incurred by the other spouse
prior to the marriage; or (2) the obligation was incurred by the
other spouse during the marriage and is non-tortious.23
Community property subject to joint management and control of
the spouses can be attached to satisfy any obligation incurred by
either of the spouses.24 Community property is subject to all
tortious obligations incurred by either or both spouses during
the marriage.25
Texas is unique in its treatment of joint management and
control over community property. Except in certain specific
circumstances provided by statute, each spouse has power to
manage his undivided one-half interest in the property, but has
no power to manage the interest of the other spouse.26 Thus,
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.202(a) (West 2006).
See id. § 3.102(a).
See id. § 3.102(c).
See id. § 3.202(b).
See id. § 3.202(c).
See id. § 3.202(d).
See, e.g., Williams v. Portland State Bank, 514 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex.

7

ARTICLE 6_MUSSELMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

316

PACE LAW REVIEW

3/8/2019 9:18 PM

Vol. 39.1

both spouses must participate in and consent to a particular
transaction with respect to community property subject to joint
management and control.27
It is clear then that Texas does not adhere strictly to the
basic concept of the managerial system for marital property
liability, which is that a creditor should be entitled to seize any
community property with respect to which a spouse personally
liable for a debt has the power to manage, and thereby
voluntarily alienate to a creditor. A spouse lacks the power to
alienate to a creditor the other spouse’s one-half undivided
interest in joint management community property, yet
community property subject to joint management and control of
the spouses can be attached to satisfy any obligation incurred by
either of the spouses. Additionally, all community property is
subject to all tortious obligations incurred by either or both
spouses during the marriage, regardless of which spouse has
management power over the property. However, it is equally
clear that Texas comes the closest by far to achieving the goal
underlying this basic concept.
The remaining four states that are typically grouped in the
managerial system category—California, Idaho, Louisiana, and
Nevada—provide rules for determining management and
control of community property that seem wholly unrelated to the
applicable rules that determine which community property is
available to satisfy debts incurred by only one spouse. In fact, it
has been suggested that California and Louisiana are included
in the managerial system category solely because they
determine liability of marital property for debts without regard
to whether the debt was incurred in the interest of the family or
for the benefit of the community, and thus clearly do not fit into

App. 1974) (holding that a lien conveyed by husband to bank on real property
was not effective with regard to wife’s one-half interest in community property
because wife did not execute the deed of trust).
27. See WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR., CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL & SALLY BROWN
RICHARDSON, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 255 (8th ed.
Carolina Acad. Press 2015) (noting that the Texas statutes dealing with joint
management of community property require concurrence of both spouses); see
also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.104 (West 2006) (providing an important
exception allowing a spouse to alienate the entirety of joint management
community property titled in that spouse’s name or in that spouse’s possession
(if not subject to evidence of ownership) once certain conditions are met).
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the community debt system category.28 In all four states, the
basic rule with respect to management of community personal
property is that each spouse has the power unilaterally to
manage and alienate all such property;29 for management of
community real property, the basic rule is that both spouses
must act together to manage or alienate the property.30
With regard to liability of community property for debts
solely incurred by one spouse, California and Louisiana, by
statute, permit creditors to reach almost any community
property for virtually any debt incurred by either spouse
regardless of which spouse has management power over that
property.31 California affords a limited exception to that basic
rule, providing that earnings during marriage are exempt from

28. See Carroll, supra note 6, at 13–14 (noting that California and
Louisiana are grouped with Idaho, Nevada, and Texas under the managerial
umbrella because those states determine liability of marital property without
regard to whether the particular debt was incurred in the interest of the family
or for the benefit of the community, both of which are hallmarks of the
community debt system); see also REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note
27, at 312 (explaining that the current rules in all states which utilize the
management system, other than Texas, “make it difficult, if not misleading, to
say that management power determines” the right of creditors to seize
community property for the debts of only one spouse, “[y]et the chief
implication of a managerial system, that the creditor’s right to seize
community property does not depend on the classification of the debt as a
community debt, is still the rule” in those states).
29. See REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 255 (stating that,
in all community property states other than Texas, “the basic rule concerning
power to manage and alienate community personal property is equal
management based on concurrently possessed power to act unilaterally”
(footnote omitted)); CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(a) (West 2004); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 32-912 (LexisNexis 2006); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2346 (West 2009); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.230 (LexisNexis 2007).
30. See REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 255 n.1 (stating
that “[w]ith respect to community realty, the basic rule in equal management
jurisdictions is that alienation requires concurrent actions by both
spouses . . .”); CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1102(a) (West 2004); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 32-912 (LexisNexis 2006); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2347 (West 2009); and
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.230 (LexisNexis 2007).
31. See CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. § 910(a) (West 2004) (providing that, except
in limited situations provided specifically by statute, all community property
is liable for any debt incurred by either spouse before or during marriage,
regardless of which spouse has management rights with respect to the property
and which spouse is personally liable for the debt); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
2345 (West 2009) (providing that a separate or community obligation may be
satisfied from community property).
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debts incurred by the other spouse prior to marriage if certain
requirements are met.32 Idaho has a statute that allows either
spouse to “bind the community property by contract.”33
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Idaho has long held that all
“debts of either spouse may be paid from community property.”34
Courts have similarly held that the basic rule in Nevada is the
same as in California, Louisiana, and Idaho—that all
community property is within creditor reach for any debt
incurred by either of the spouses.35 Similar to California,
Nevada has a statute stating simply that a spouse’s share of
community property is exempt from debts of the other spouse
contracted for prior to marriage.36
B. The Community Debt System
Arizona, New Mexico, Washington, and Wisconsin are
typically categorized under the community debt system.37
Under this system, determining whether a judgment creditor
can attach nonexempt property owned in whole or in part by the
non-liable spouse requires that the debt first be classified as a
separate or community debt.38 Classification of debts is
determined based on whether the spouse incurring the debt was
acting for the benefit of the community.39 If this is the case, the
32. See CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. § 911 (West 2004).
33. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-912 (LexisNexis 2006) (providing that either
spouse may bind the community property by contract).
34. See Credit Bureau of E. Idaho, Inc., v. Lecheminant, 235 P.3d 1188,
1192–93 (Idaho 2010) (citations omitted) (explaining that community property
is liable for debts of either spouse).
35. See United States v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 816 F.2d 487, 491 n.12
(9th Cir. 1987) (stating that in equal management community property states,
including California, Louisiana, Idaho, and Nevada, debts incurred by only one
spouse during marriage may be satisfied from community property and from
the separate property of the liable spouse).
36. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.050 (LexisNexis 2007).
37. See Carroll, supra note 6, at 17 (stating that Arizona, New Mexico,
Washington, and Wisconsin have rejected the managerial system and have
instead opted for the community debt system); see also REPPY, SAMUEL &
RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 327.
38. See REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 327 (stating that
those states “require that tort and contract debts be classified as community
or separate at the time the creditor seeks to be paid”).
39. See Carroll, supra note 6, at 17 (stating that the policy supporting the
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debt is classified as a community debt, meaning that community
property can be attached to satisfy a judgment obtained with
respect to it.40
Case law in Arizona, New Mexico, and Washington has
created a presumption that all contractual debts incurred during
marriage are community debts.41 Wisconsin has a statute that
specifically provides for this presumption and extends to tortious
obligations.42 Each state requires clear and convincing evidence
to overcome this presumption.43 Thus, only in rare instances
will a debt incurred during marriage not be classified as a
community debt.44
In Wisconsin, the community debt
presumption can be made conclusive if the debtor unilaterally
signs a statement before the obligation is incurred stating: “the
obligation is or will be incurred in the interest of the marriage
or the family.”45 New Mexico has a statute that allows a spouse
and creditor to agree, at the time a debt is incurred, that it will
be classified as separate.46 In Arizona, New Mexico, and
Washington, where there is no presumption that tortious
obligations incurred during marriage are community debts,
courts have generally been willing to find that most such
obligations were incurred for the benefit of the community and,

community debt system is that community property should be held liable only
for debts incurred while a spouse is acting for the benefit of the community).
40. See id. at 6, 17–18 (explaining that, once a debt is classified as a
community debt, in all the community debt states except Wisconsin, “the
entirety of the community property between husband and wife . . . could be
seized to satisfy the husband’s premarital debt” (footnote omitted)).
41. See id. at 18 (stating that those states “employ a presumption that a
contractual obligation incurred by a spouse during marriage is one for the
benefit of the community, and thus is a community debt” (footnote omitted));
see also REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 328.
42. See WISC. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(1) (West 2009).
43. See Carroll, supra note 6, at 18–19 (stating that the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard is required to overcome the community debt
presumption in every community debt state); see also REPPY, SAMUEL &
RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 328.
44. See REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 328–29
(discussing two Washington cases in which the court held that contractual
obligations incurred during marriage were not community debts).
45. WISC. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(1) (West 2009); see also Carroll, supra note
6, at 19.
46. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-9(A)(4) (2016); see also REPPY, SAMUEL &
RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 329.
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thus, are community obligations.47
Premarital obligations are not community debts. The
obligor spouse could not have been acting for the benefit of the
community when incurring the debt because the marriage did
not yet exist at that time.48
After debts have been classified as either separate or
community, it can then be determined which marital property is
subject to attachment for those debts. The rules differ among
the states using the community debt system. New Mexico
provides for a statutory scheme by which community debts must
be satisfied from the following property in the order stated: first,
from all community property and certain other property in
which the spouses own an equal interest, except for the spouses’
residence; second, from the residence of the spouses except as
otherwise provided; third, from the separate property of the
spouse who is obligated for the debt.49 Separate debts must be
satisfied from the following property in the order stated: first,
from the separate property of the spouse who is obligated for the
debt, except for certain property in which the spouses own an
equal interest; second, from the obligated spouse’s one-half
interest in community property and certain other property in
which the spouses own an equal interest, except for the spouses’
residence; third, from the obligated spouse’s interest in the
residence of the spouses except as otherwise provided.50 Thus,
in New Mexico, community debts are generally satisfied from
community property and from separate property of the obligated
spouse. Separate debts, including debts incurred prior to
marriage, are satisfied generally from separate property of the
obligated spouse and that spouse’s one-half interest in
community property.

47. See REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 329 (explaining
that, although the burden of proof is on the tort victim/creditor to prove that
the tortious activity benefited the community, courts have held that
“recreation—just enjoying life—is a community activity,” and the resulting
tortious obligations were thus community debts).
48. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-9(A)(1) (2016) (specifically including
debts contracted or incurred by a spouse before marriage in the definition of a
separate debt).
49. See id. § 40-3-11(A).
50. See id. § 40-3-10(A).
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Arizona’s rules are also provided by statute and treat
premarital debt in a separate category than debt incurred
during marriage.
Community property is liable for the
premarital debts of a spouse “only to the extent of the value of
that spouse’s contribution to the community property which
would have been such spouse’s separate property if single.”51
Community debt incurred during the marriage must be satisfied
“first, from the community property, and second, from the
separate property of the spouse contracting the debt or
obligation.”52 Separate debts can be satisfied only from the
separate property of the spouse obligated for the debt.53
Wisconsin also provides for a statutory scheme. Wisconsin
is similar to Arizona in the manner which it treats premarital
debts, which can only be satisfied from the separate property of
the spouse obligated for the debt and from that part of the
community property “which would have been the property of
that spouse but for the enactment of this chapter.”54 Wisconsin
differs, however, from New Mexico and Arizona by treating
tortious obligations incurred by a spouse during marriage
separately from other obligations incurred during marriage.
Tortious obligations incurred by a spouse during marriage may
be satisfied from the separate property of that spouse and from
that spouse’s interest in community property.55 Non-tortious
community debts incurred during marriage can be satisfied from
all community property and from the separate property of the
liable spouse.56 Non-tortious separate debts incurred during
marriage can be satisfied first from the separate property of that
spouse, and second from that spouse’s interest in community
property, in that order.57
51. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-215(B) (West 2007).
52. Id. § 25-215(D)
53. See REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 327–28 (citing
GAF Corp. v. Diamond Carpet Corp., 572 P.2d 125 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)).
54. WISC. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.31, 766.55(2)(c)(2) (West 2009) (using and
defining the terms marital property and individual property, which are
generally considered substantially similar to community property and separate
property, as those terms are used in the other eight community property
states).
55. See id. § 766.55(2)(cm).
56. Id. § 766.55(2)(b).
57. See id. §§ 766.55(2)(d), 766.555 (providing special rules that apply to
an open-end plan, defined to include credit cards and similar types of credit
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The rules in Washington have been established mostly by
case law. As in Wisconsin, Washington distinguishes tortious
from non-tortious obligations and treats them differently, but in
a somewhat more convoluted manner. For tortious obligations
which are incurred during marriage and are classified as
community debts, creditors can reach the separate property of
the obligated spouse and all of the community property.58 For
tortious obligations incurred during marriage that are classified
as separate debts, creditors can first reach the separate property
of the obligated spouse and then that spouse’s one-half interest
in community property, in that order.59 The same rule applies
to tortious obligations incurred prior to marriage.60 For nontortious debts incurred prior to marriage, Washington has a
statute allowing those debts to be satisfied from the earnings
and accumulations of the obligated spouse if judgment is
obtained within three years of the marriage.61 For non-tortious
debts incurred during the marriage, the rules in Washington are
similar to those in Arizona. Community debts can be satisfied
from community property and from the separate property of the
obligated spouse.62 Separate debts can be satisfied only from the
separate property of the spouse obligated for the debt.63
arrangements if certain conditions are met).
58. See deElche v. Jacobsen, 622 P.2d 835, 840 (Wash. 1980) (holding that
torts classified as community obligations “will remain community torts with
the community and the tortfeasor separately liable”).
59. See id. (holding that, for torts not classified as community obligations,
separate property of the tortfeasor will be primarily liable and, if that property
is insufficient to satisfy the obligation, the tortfeasor’s one-half interest in
community personal property will become liable); see also Keene v. Edie, 935
P.2d 588, 594–95 (Wash. 1997) (holding that, for torts not classified as
community obligations, the tortfeasor’s one-half interest in community real
property is liable after exhaustion of the tortfeasor’s separate property and
one-half interest in community personal property).
60. See Haley v. Highland, 12 P.3d 119, 127 (Wash. 2000) (holding that
the rules applicable to torts not classified as community obligations apply also
to torts committed prior to marriage).
61. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.200 (West 2005).
62. See REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 328 (stating that
the rules in Arizona, New Mexico, and Wisconsin, which allows community
creditors to reach both community property and the obligor spouse’s separate
property, is probably the rule in Washington as well, and citing authority for
that proposition).
63. See Nichols Hills Bank v. McCool, 701 P.2d 1114 (Wash. 1985)
(explaining that the rules adopted in deElche for separate tort obligations
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III. Liability of Spouses After Divorce in Community Property
Jurisdictions for Debts Solely Incurred by the Other Spouse
Prior to or During Marriage
When married couples divorce, new issues arise with
respect to obligations one or both of the spouses incurred either
prior to or during the marriage. Common law and community
property jurisdictions alike have established rules for courts to
use in dealing with those obligations in the context of the divorce
and in dividing the marital property estate. One issue likely to
arise in most situations is to what extent a creditor can bring an
action against the spouses after the divorce to collect its debt. A
general rule that prevails in all of the common law and
community property states is that a divorce decree ordering one
spouse to pay a debt is binding only on the spouses and not on a
creditor which was not a party to the decree; the divorce decree
cannot reduce any rights the creditor had prior to the divorce.64
Thus, if both spouses are liable for an obligation, the creditor
can, either prior to or after divorce, bring an action and obtain
a personal judgment against either or both of them.65
The particular issue that will be addressed here is one that
has become quite troublesome in the community property
jurisdictions: namely, to what extent a creditor is allowed to
constituted a departure from the general rule that a creditor is not allowed to
reach community property to satisfy a separate debt).
64. See REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 335 (discussing
a general rule that a divorce decree “cannot reduce the rights of pre-divorce
creditors of one spouse to reach property awarded the other if that property
would have been liable absent the divorce”); see also Margaret M. Mahoney,
Debts, Divorce, and Disarray in Bankruptcy, 73 UMKC L. REV. 83, 88 (2004)
(stating the general rule that rights of a creditor established during the
marriage of the debtor is not affected by the debtor’s subsequent divorce).
65. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2357 (West 2009) (providing that an
obligation incurred by a spouse during marriage may be satisfied after divorce
from separate property of that spouse); Sunwest Bank of Albuquerque v.
Roderiguez, 770 P.2d 533, 538 (N.M. 1989) (holding that the spouses’ marriage
settlement agreement pursuant to their divorce had no effect on the rights of
a pre-divorce creditor who was not a party to the agreement); Marine Midland
Bank v. Monroe, 756 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Nev. 1988) (holding that a divorce decree
to which a creditor was not a party did not divest the creditor of the right to
collect its debt from a spouse who was liable); Broadway Drug Store of
Galveston, Inc. v. Trowbridge, 435 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968)
(holding that a “court in a divorce action has no power to disturb the rights
which creditors lawfully have against the parties”).
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obtain a judgment after divorce against a spouse who is not
personally liable for a debt solely incurred by the other spouse
either before or during the marriage and, accordingly, to what
extent such a creditor is allowed to attach nonexempt property
either received by the non-liable spouse in the divorce or
subsequently acquired by such spouse.66 This is not an issue in
common law property jurisdictions for the reasons discussed in
Part II. Generally, when only one spouse is personally liable for
an obligation in common law property states, a judgment
creditor cannot attach property owned by the other spouse to
satisfy the judgment.67 Spouses in common law property
jurisdictions are treated as separate persons with regard to
obligations incurred by only one of them during the marriage.68
The rules developed by each of the community property
jurisdictions with respect to this issue are quite distinct and will
be discussed separately for each jurisdiction.
A. Idaho
The rules in Idaho for dealing with this issue were explained
by the Supreme Court of Idaho in Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co.
v. Holley.69 In that case, John Holley (“Husband”) borrowed
money from Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. (“Bank”) for use in a
construction business which he operated.70 On June 26, 1981,
66. This is not a significant issue in common law property jurisdictions.
See generally Mahoney, supra note 1, at 456 (explaining the post-divorce rights
of creditors in common law property jurisdictions, namely that, while courts in
common law property states have a certain amount of power in a divorce to
allocate marital debts between the spouses, those courts have no power to
modify the rights of third-party creditors with respect to the individual
spouses, unless the creditors are joined as parties in the divorce proceeding.
As a result, a creditor will be entitled after the divorce to proceed against
whichever of the spouses is personally liable for the obligation. That is, of
course, the same right the creditor has during the marriage in a common law
jurisdiction.).
67. See Mahoney, supra note 1, at 449–50 (explaining that, in the fortyone common law property states, liability for unsecured debts is limited to the
spouse who incurred the debt).
68. See id. at 445 (noting that in the common law property states, spouses
retain their separate identity with regard to both debts and ownership of
assets).
69. 723 P.2d 893 (Idaho 1986).
70. Id. at 894.
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Husband borrowed additional funds from Bank and executed an
unsecured promissory note, due on September 28, 1981, for the
total amount owed to Bank.71 Husband was married to Joan
Holley (“Wife”) at the time of these events, but Wife did not
execute the promissory note.72 Husband and Wife were divorced
on August 28, 1981, pursuant to which Husband was awarded
the construction business (a community asset) and assumed
liability for payment of the June 26, 1981 promissory note.73
Husband did not pay that note on its September 28, 1981 due
date, instead executing with Bank an agreement extending the
due date of the promissory note to November 22, 1981 and
granting to Bank a security interest in certain real and personal
property to secure the note.74 Husband was solvent at the time
he executed the extension agreement, but subsequently
defaulted on his obligation to Bank and filed for bankruptcy.75
The Bank eventually sued Wife for non-payment of the
promissory note.76
In its opinion, the Court explained “[t]his case can be
resolved based on fundamental principles governing the debtorcreditor relationship.”77 When a creditor obtains a judgment, he
can proceed to collect his judgment by executing on the debtor’s
assets. Those rules apply in the same way to married and
unmarried debtors.78 The only difference is that, if the debtor is
married, the creditor can execute on community property owned
by the debtor and his spouse as well as the debtor’s separate
property.79 In this case, only Husband executed the promissory
note and was personally liable for the obligation to Bank.80 On
June 26, 1981, when Bank had a claim against Husband for
unpaid obligations due at that time and Husband and Wife were
still married, Bank could have brought an action against
Husband and Wife, obtained a judgment, and proceeded to
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 894–95.
Id. at 895.
Id.
Id.
Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. Holley, 723 P.2d 893 (Idaho 1986).
Id.
Id. at 896.
Id.
Id. at 896–97.
Id. at 897.
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collect that judgment from Husband and Wife’s community
property and Husband’s separate property.81 Instead, Bank
chose to have Husband execute a promissory note due
September 28, 1981.82 When that note became due, Husband
and Wife were already divorced.83 The Bank was unsuccessful
in its efforts against Husband to fully satisfy Husband’s
obligation to Bank pursuant to the promissory note.84
The issue then became whether Bank could bring an action
against Wife, who was not personally liable on the promissory
note, obtain a judgment, and collect that judgment from formerly
community property received in the divorce by Wife.85 The Court
held that “a creditor may not, with one exception, proceed
against community assets distributed to [a spouse] pursuant to
a divorce decree” if that spouse is not personally liable for the
obligation to that creditor.86 The Court cited to an earlier case,
Spokane Merchants’ Ass’n v. Olmstead,87 for the exception: in a
divorce, when only one spouse is personally liable for an
obligation incurred during the marriage, “but is not awarded
sufficient community assets to satisfy such a debt, a creditor
may properly seek satisfaction for the debt from community
property distributed to the other spouse.”88 The Court explained
the purpose for the exception is to prevent spouses from utilizing
“divorce proceedings to perpetrate a fraud on creditors of the
community.”89 It held that the exception did not apply in Twin
Falls because the trial record clearly indicated that “sufficient
assets were distributed to [Husband] as part of the divorce
proceedings which would have enabled him to satisfy the
community obligation [to Bank] which he assumed pursuant to
the property settlement agreement.”90 Accordingly, the Court

81. Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. Holley, 723 P.2d 893 (Idaho 1986).
82. Id. at 894–95.
83. Id. at 895.
84. Id. at 897.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. Holley, 723 P.2d 893, 897 (Idaho 1986)
(citing 327 P.2d 385 (Idaho 1958)).
88. Id. at 897.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 898.
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held in favor of Wife.91
The rules in Idaho with respect to this issue are very
restrictive with regard to rights of creditors. A creditor who
extends credit for which only one spouse is personally liable will
potentially have fewer rights to execute on property in a
collection action if its debtor spouse is divorced before the
creditor brings its action. Any community property that would
be available to the creditor for execution during the marriage
will not be available if distributed to the non-liable spouse in the
divorce, subject to the exception stated in Twin Falls.
B. California
The rules in California with respect to this issue are
provided by statute and are potentially very restrictive as to
rights of creditors. The basic premise underlying the statute is
that debts owed by the spouses at the time of divorce will be
assigned for payment to one of the spouses as part of the division
of property in the divorce.92 The statute provides that such
assignment cannot relieve a spouse of personal liability for a
debt for which such spouse is personally liable at the time of the
divorce.93 Thus, if both spouses are personally liable for a debt,
they will remain personally liable after the divorce, regardless
of which spouse was assigned the debt for payment. Likewise, if
only one spouse is personally liable for a debt and the debt is
assigned to the other spouse, the liable spouse will remain
personally liable after the divorce. When a debt for which only
one spouse is personally liable is assigned to the non-liable
spouse, the effect is to make that non-liable spouse personally
liable for the debt;94 but if that debt is not assigned to the nonliable spouse, none of that spouse’s separate property owned at
the time of divorce or community property received by that
91. Id.
92. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 916(a) (West 2004) (providing that debts be
assigned for payment to one of the spouses in a divorce).
93. Id. § 916(a)(1) (providing that a spouse remains personally liable for
a debt incurred by that spouse before or during marriage regardless of whether
the debt was assigned to the other spouse in the divorce).
94. Id. § 916(a)(3) (providing that a spouse to whom a debt, incurred by
the other spouse before or during marriage, is assigned for payment in the
divorce is personally liable for such debt).
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spouse in the divorce is liable for that debt, and that spouse has
no personal liability for that debt.95
Because debts are normally assigned under these provisions
to the spouse who is personally liable for the debt, these rules
usually have the effect of substantially restricting the rights of
creditors subsequent to the divorce.96 Consistent with Idaho, a
creditor who extends credit for which only one spouse is
personally liable will potentially have fewer rights to execute on
property in a collection action if its debtor-spouse is divorced
before the creditor brings its action. Any community property
that would be available to the creditor for execution during the
marriage will not be available if it is distributed to the non-liable
spouse in the divorce and if such non-liable spouse is not
assigned the debt for payment. However, if the non-liable
spouse is assigned the debt for payment in the divorce, the
creditor’s rights will actually be increased after the divorce
because assignment of the debt to the non-liable spouse will
make that spouse personally liable for the debt. The creditor
could then execute on separate property of the non-liable spouse,
including property acquired by such spouse after the divorce,
which the creditor would not have been entitled to do had there
been no divorce.97
These statutory provisions have been criticized for enabling
spouses to agree to the terms of their divorce and utilize
strategies that detrimentally affect their creditors.98 For
95. Id. § 916(a)(2) (providing that a spouse is not liable for a debt incurred
by the other spouse before or during marriage unless that debt was assigned
for payment to such spouse in the divorce).
96. See REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 336 (stating that
“in the usual situation where the debt is assigned to the debtor-spouse, divorce
will often relegate the creditor of the debtor-spouse to half of the community
property he could have reached before the divorce”); see also Mejia v. Reed, 74
P.3d 166, 171 (Cal. 2003) (stating that the legislature, in enacting the
predecessor statute to Section 916 of the California Family Code, determined
that, in most circumstances, after a divorce, it is unwise to continue the
liability of spouses for community debts incurred by the other spouse).
97. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text (explaining that, in the
community property jurisdictions, a judgment creditor cannot attach separate
property owned by a spouse to satisfy a judgment with respect to an obligation
for which only the other spouse is personally liable).
98. See Ratner, supra, note 8, at 212–13 (describing how the rules in
California allowing married couples to decide the manner in which their debts
will be assigned has the potential for detrimentally affecting the rights of their
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example, assume that only husband is personally liable for all
the debts incurred during the marriage; the couple could
strategically divorce and assign all the debts to husband and
agree that wife will receive all the community property.
Husband will have no assets which the creditors can attach after
the divorce. California courts have responded to these concerns
by identifying an important exception to the statutory provisions
for situations in which blind application of the statutory rules
would result in substantial unfairness to the rights of
creditors.99 In Mejia v. Reed,100 a husband (“Husband”) had an
extramarital relationship, resulting in the birth of a child, and
was subsequently ordered to pay child support to the child’s
mother (“Creditor”).101 The Husband and his wife later divorced,
the terms of which they memorialized in a marital settlement
agreement (“MSA”).102 The MSA required Husband to transfer
all of his interest in jointly owned real property to wife.103 The
property received by husband pursuant to the MSA ultimately
proved to be worthless, and husband was subsequently left with
no assets and little income with which to pay the child support
obligation.104 Creditor filed an action asserting that the transfer
of husband’s interest in the real property to wife under the MSA
constituted a fraudulent transfer and requested that a lien be
imposed upon the property pursuant to California fraudulent
transfer law.105 In this case of first impression in California, the
Court addressed the issue of whether the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act (“UFTA”), as adopted by California, applies to
transfers of property in a divorce under California Family Code
Section 916.106 The Court was forced to apply established rules
of statutory construction to resolve that issue and noted that

creditors).
99. See REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 336 (discussing
situations in which California courts have held that a creditor is not bound by
the property division in a divorce).
100. See generally 74 P.3d at 166–176.
101. Id. at 169.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Mejia v. Reed, 74 P.3d 166, 169 (Cal. 2003).
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neither statute expressly refers to the other.107 After evaluating
the two separate statutory schemes and addressing issues of
public policy, the Court determined that the UFTA did, in fact,
apply to property transfers in divorce pursuant to marital
settlement agreements.108 The Court then applied the UFTA to
the case at bar and determined that whether Husband engaged
in actual fraud with regard to the transfer of his interest in the
real property to his wife under the MSA was “a triable issue for
decision by the trial court,” and accordingly remanded the case
for further proceedings.109
C. Louisiana
The rules in Louisiana with respect to this issue are
provided by statute. The general rule is mostly neutral with
respect to creditors, providing that “[a]n obligation incurred by
a spouse before or during the community property regime may
be satisfied after termination of the regime from the property of
the former community and from the separate property of the
spouse who incurred the obligation.”110 Thus, the general rule
extends the rules for liability of marital property for debts
incurred prior to or during marriage to the period after
divorce.111 Because creditors can reach the same property after
divorce and during the marriage, their rights are typically
neither reduced nor enhanced as a result of a divorce. In
107. Id.
108. Id. at 170–74 (quoting Lezine v. Sec. Pac. Fin. Servs., Inc., 925 P.2d
1002, 1013 (Cal. 1996)) (explaining that the Court noted California legislative
policy requires a court to allocate debts to spouses in a divorce to account for
the rights of creditors “so there will be available sufficient property to satisfy
the debt by the person to whom the debt is assigned”). In limiting its decision
to property transfers pursuant to marital settlement agreements, the Court
noted that “when the court divides the marital property in the absence of an
agreement by the parties, it must divide the property equally . . . which
provides some protection for a creditor of one spouse only.” Id. at 173.
109. Id. at 174–76.
110. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2357 (West 2009).
111. See id. art. 2345 (providing that a separate or community obligation
may be satisfied from community property); see also supra notes 2–3 and
accompanying text (explaining that, in the community property jurisdictions,
a judgment creditor cannot attach separate property owned by a spouse to
satisfy a judgment with respect to an obligation for which only the other spouse
is personally liable).
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addition, the statute provides that “[i]f a spouse disposes of
property of the former community for a purpose other than the
satisfaction of community obligations, he is liable for all
obligations incurred by the other spouse up to the value of that
community property.”112 The term community obligation is
defined for purposes of this statute as “[a]n obligation incurred
by a spouse during the existence of a community property regime
for the common interest of the spouses or for the interest of the
other spouse.”113 A spouse can avoid the liability imposed under
this statute for disposing of former community property after
divorce by assuming, in writing, “responsibility for one-half of
each community obligation incurred by the other spouse.”114
D. Texas
The rules in Texas with respect to this issue have been
provided by a majority of the intermediate courts of appeal; the
Supreme Court of Texas has not ruled directly on the issue.115
The existence of the rules provided by the courts of appeal,
however, appear to be universally accepted by “respected
academicians, continuing legal education speakers, practice
guides, and popular bar review outlines.”116 The general rule is
the same as that in Louisiana: unsecured creditors of a spouse
are allowed to attach the same property after divorce as they
could have attached during the marriage.117
The principal decision cited as authority for this rule is
Stewart Title Co. v. Huddleston,118 decided by the San Antonio
112. Id. art. 2357.
113. Id. art. 2360.
114. Id. art. 2357.
115. See Paulsen, supra note 9, at 794–810.
116. Id. at 794–96 (citations omitted); but see Joseph W. McKnight,
Commentary to Family Code § 5.61, 21 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1108, 1110 (1990)
(soundly criticizing the rationale for these rules); Paulsen, supra note 9, at
815–49 (same).
117. See Paulsen, supra note 9, at 794–810 (explaining that “the idea that
one spouse’s unsecured creditors can reach the same assets after divorce as
those creditors could reach beforehand” has wide support in Texas, and
referring to an outstanding and exhaustive discussion of case law underlying
and explaining the development of this rule in Texas).
118. 598 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. App. 1980), writ refused NRE per curiam, 608
S.W.2d 611 (Tex. 1980).
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Court of Appeals. The Court stated that, as a general rule, “a
spouse who receives property [in a divorce] which would, absent
a divorce, be subject to the claims of creditors remains personally
liable, and the property so received remains subject to being
taken to satisfy the claims of the community creditors.”119 Thus,
if a spouse not personally liable for a debt owed to a creditor
receives property in the divorce that could have been attached
by that creditor during the marriage, the creditor is allowed to
bring a collections proceeding after divorce to attach that
property. That is true even though the spouse who received that
property in the divorce is not personally liable for the debt to
that creditor.120 An illustration provided in a previous article
published by this author is as follows:
To illustrate, Husband (H) incurs a debt to
Creditor (C), for which only H is personally liable.
H and Wife (W) own nonexempt land that is
subject to the joint management and control of
both H and W. H defaults on his debt to C, and C
sues H and obtains a judgment. Under the marital
property liability rules discussed above, C may
attach the land to satisfy the judgment. If, before
C either acquires his judgment or attaches the
land, H and W are divorced, and W receives the
land in the divorce, C may obtain a judgment
against W and attach the land, notwithstanding
that W has no personal liability to C with respect
to the debt. W, however, will have no personal
liability with respect to the judgment. The
judgment will be ‘in rem’ with respect to the land,

119. Id. at 323 (citations omitted).
120. See Musselman, supra note 11, at 260 (explaining the circumstances
pursuant to which a creditor can bring a collection action post-divorce against
a spouse who is not personally liable for the debt owed to that creditor). The
right to bring that action by the creditor does not create personal liability for
the non-liable spouse receiving the property in the divorce; it is only the
property that is liable for the debt. See id. (citing State Farm Lloyds, Inc. v.
Williams, 791 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. App., 1990) writ denied, 791 S.W.2d 542 (Tex.
App. 1990)) (stating that the creditor can obtain only an “‘in rem’ judgment
against the property as opposed to a personal judgment against the spouse who
received that property in the divorce”).
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meaning that its sole effect will be to allow C to
attach the land to satisfy the judgment.121
Thus, the rules in Texas regarding this issue are mostly
neutral with respect to creditors. Because creditors can reach
the same property after divorce that they can reach during the
marriage, their rights are typically neither reduced nor
enhanced as a result of a divorce.122
E. Washington
The rules in Washington for dealing with this issue were
explained by the Supreme Court of Washington in Watters v.
Doud.123 In that case, Charles Doud (“Husband”), during his
marriage to Judith Doud (“Wife”), executed a promissory note
payable to Harry Watters (“Creditor”) to evidence a debt in the
approximate amount of $15,000.124
Husband and Wife
subsequently divorced; the property settlement provided that
Husband would pay the debt to Creditor and that the community
home would be transferred to Wife.125 Husband eventually
defaulted on the debt to Creditor, and Creditor acquired a
judgment and attempted to satisfy it by executing on the
community home received by Wife in the divorce.126
The first issue addressed by the Court—and the only issue
relevant here—was “whether after a marriage dissolution,
previously community held assets are fully available, including
their post-divorce appreciated value, to satisfy debts incurred by
the former marital community.”127 The Court cited to its
previous decisions holding that “separate property contributions
to an asset previously owned by the marital community, and
which were made after the divorce, are not subject to preexisting

121. Id.
122. But see Paulsen, supra note 9, at 841–42 (describing a situation in
which a creditor’s position could be enhanced as a result of a divorce).
123. See generally 631 P.2d 369 (Wash. 1981) (en banc).
124. Id. at 370.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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community debts.”128 The Court stated that previous cases had
held only that property “formerly owned by the community can
be levied upon for the community’s debts,”129 and that the issue
regarding post-divorce appreciation in value was one of first
impression in Washington.130 The Court decided the issue by
adopting the rule prevailing at that time in California;131
namely, that “since all property becomes separate upon divorce,
all net equity arising thereafter must be separate in character
and thus is unavailable to community creditors.”132 The Court
explained that it was adopting that rule because it “is preferable
on the basis of equity and generally applicable community
property principles,”133 noting that “[o]ur cases have also
exempted separate property and its appreciation from the claims
of community creditors.”134 The Court further justified its
decision by explaining that “[c]reditors are adequately protected
without making post-divorce equity available to them” because
they are permitted “to execute upon formerly community held
assets to the extent of the community’s net equity [at the time of
divorce].”135 The Court also noted that creditors have other
traditional remedies available to them, such as having “a
property settlement agreement set aside by proving the divorce
was an attempt to defraud them.”136
The rules with respect to this issue are thus somewhat more
limited in Washington with regard to the rights of creditors than
those in Louisiana and Texas. Creditors in Louisiana and Texas
are permitted to attach the same property after divorce that they
can during marriage to the full extent of the value of that
property at the time of attachment, including any post-divorce
appreciation in the value of such property. Creditors in
Washington are allowed to attach all property that was formerly
part of the community property estate, but only to the extent of
the net equity in such property at the time of the divorce.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
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Watters v. Doud, 631 P.2d 369, 371 (Wash. 1981) (en banc).
Id.
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Wisconsin

The rules in Wisconsin with respect to this issue are
provided by statute. The basic rule is similar to that in
Washington: creditors are allowed to attach all property that
was formerly part of the community property estate, but only to
the extent of the value of such property at the time of the
divorce.137 However, creditors in Wisconsin are provided
additional rights post-divorce that are substantially greater
than Washington creditors could ever receive. First, the divorce
decree may provide that income of a spouse be available after
the divorce to satisfy a community debt for which only the other
spouse is personally liable; absent such a provision, no such
income of the non-liable spouse is available for satisfaction of
such a debt.138 Second, the divorce decree may provide for the
imposition of personal liability on a spouse after the divorce for
a community debt for which only the other spouse is personally
liable.139
Thus, creditors in Wisconsin are afforded the same rights as
creditors in Washington under the basic rule. If a Wisconsin
creditor is provided the right to reach post-divorce income of a
non-liable spouse to satisfy a community debt, that creditor is
treated similar to creditors in Texas and Louisiana with respect
to that particular debt. As discussed earlier, community debts
in Wisconsin can be satisfied during marriage from community
property, so allowing a creditor to satisfy its obligation from
post-divorce income of the non-liable spouse constitutes a
limited extension of that creditor’s rights during the marriage to
the period after divorce. If, however, the divorce decree also
provides for the imposition of personal liability for a community
debt on a non-liable spouse, that creditor’s rights will be
significantly enhanced simply because of the divorce, and the
creditor will consequently receive a windfall. The creditor will
now be entitled to file an action against the previously non-liable
spouse and obtain a judgment that is enforceable, not only
against community property received in the divorce, but also

137. See WISC. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(2m) (West 2009).
138. Id.
139. Id.
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against that spouse’s separate property owned during the
marriage and any property that spouse acquires after the
divorce.
G. Arizona
Arizona has a statutory scheme providing for the treatment
of debts in a divorce proceeding,140 but that scheme does not
specifically resolve this issue.141 The rules in Arizona with
respect to this issue have been provided by the intermediate
courts of appeal; the Supreme Court of Arizona has not ruled
directly on the issue. In Community Guardian Bank v.
Hamlin,142 Jerry Hamlin (“Husband”) was solely liable for an
obligation to Community Guardian Bank (“Bank”).143 Bank
brought an action against both Husband and Janice Hamlin
(“Wife”) alleging several counts, including unjust enrichment.144
A default judgment was obtained against Wife on the unjust
enrichment count.145 Bank served a writ of garnishment against
Wife’s employer, and Husband and Wife subsequently
divorced.146
Wife then moved to quash the writ of
garnishment.147 Wife argued that Bank was not entitled to
140. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (West 2007).
141. See Ratner, supra note 8, at 215 (referring to the statutory scheme
as a “creditors bill of rights” with regard to divorce proceedings); see also ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-318(E)(2), (H), (J), (L), (West 2007) (providing that a
court may require parties to submit a proposed debt distribution plan which,
inter alia, states how community creditors will be paid. Additionally, courts
are required to reflect, in its orders, the debt distribution plan that it approves.
The statute also authorizes a court to impose liens on the separate property of
a spouse or on the community property a spouse receives in the divorce to
secure the payment of community debts that the court orders that spouse to
pay. It does not specify whether that lien would be imposed in favor of the
creditor or the other spouse. The statute makes clear, however, that the
assignment of community debts to one spouse or the other for payment is
binding on the spouses only and not on any creditors. Thus, any such lien
would apparently be in favor of the other spouse only). This statutory scheme
does not specifically resolve the issue regarding the rights of creditors after
divorce with respect to a debt for which only one spouse is liable.
142. See generally 898 P.2d 1005 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
143. Id. at 1007.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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garnish her post-divorce wages because she was not personally
liable to Bank for the obligation.148 The Court first determined
that the default judgment against Wife was a community
obligation because Bank alleged in its complaint that the
obligation was created on behalf of and for the benefit of the
community estate.149 The Court then discussed Arizona law
regarding the obligations of spouses after divorce for community
debts.150 The Court stated that “[a] divorce court has the
statutory power to divide the community assets and
obligations. . . . However, the court’s allocation of community
obligations does not affect the rights of third party creditors.”151
The Court was not at all concerned with how the obligation to
Bank was allocated in the divorce; its only concern was that the
judgment created a community debt.152 The Court then stated
that the issue of whether a spouse is liable after divorce for
community debts is “quite clear in Arizona: both former spouses
remain jointly liable for community obligations after divorce.”153
The Court then held that Wife was personally liable after the
divorce for the obligation to Bank, and Bank was thus entitled
to garnish her post-divorce wages to satisfy the judgment.154
Creditors in Arizona are thus afforded greater rights than
creditors in any other state with regard to liability of spouses
after divorce for debts incurred during the marriage. Spouses
are personally liable after divorce for all community debts.
Creditor’s rights in Arizona are significantly enhanced simply
because of the divorce, and the creditor will consequently receive
a windfall. The creditor will now be entitled to file an action
against the previously non-liable spouse and obtain a judgment
enforceable not only against community property that spouse

148. Cmty. Guardian Bank v. Hamlin, 898 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1995).
149. Id. at 1009.
150. Id.
151. Id. (citations omitted).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Cmty. Guardian Bank v. Hamlin, 898 P.2d 1005, 1009 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1995); see also In Re Oliphant, 221 B.R. 506, 509 (D. Ariz. 1998) (citing Cmty.
Guardian Bank, 898 P.2d at 1009) (interpreting Arizona law and holding that,
after divorce, “each former spouse remains individually liable to creditors of
the former community”).
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receives in the divorce, but also against that spouse’s separate
property owned during the marriage and any property that
spouse acquires after the divorce.155
H. New Mexico and Nevada
Case law in New Mexico and Nevada is consistent with the
generally prevailing rule in all of the common law and
community property states, as follows: a divorce decree ordering
one spouse to pay a debt is binding only on the spouses and not
on a creditor who was not a party to the decree; the divorce
decree cannot reduce any rights the creditor had prior to the
divorce.156 Thus, if both spouses are liable for an obligation, the
creditor can, either prior to or after the divorce, bring an action
and obtain a personal judgment against either or both of them.157
No statutory or case law exists, however, in either state dealing
with the issue regarding liability of spouses after divorce for
debts incurred during the marriage by only one spouse.158
IV. Debtor-Creditor Law and Other Policy Considerations
A. General
The law of debtors and creditors in the United States has
developed over the years into an intricate system that attempts
to balance the rights and interests of each of the parties. Some
aspects of this legal system favor debtors and other aspects favor

155. See Ratner, supra note 8, at 218–23 (discussing and criticizing the
“windfall” that creditors receive under Arizona law when their married debtor
divorces his spouse.).
156. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
157. See Sunwest Bank of Albuquerque v. Roderiguez, 770 P.2d 533, 538
(N.M. 1989) (holding that the spouses’ marriage settlement agreement
pursuant to their divorce had no effect on the rights of a pre-divorce creditor
who was not a party to the agreement); Marine Midland Bank v. Monroe, 756
P.2d 1193, 1194 (Nev. 1988) (holding that a divorce decree to which a creditor
was not a party did not divest the creditor of the right to collect its debt from a
spouse who was liable).
158. See Paulsen, supra note 9, at 811 n.179 (citing to sources and
concluding that no statutory or case law exists in New Mexico or Nevada
dealing with that issue).
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creditors. Creditors have a general expectation that the law will
entitle them to be paid according to the terms of their bargain or
the rule of law which gave rise to the debt they are owed.
Creditors generally have the right in all jurisdictions to bring a
legal cause of action and obtain a judgment against a debtor who
is personally liable for an obligation to a creditor and has
defaulted on payment of such obligation.
If the debtor
subsequently declines to pay the judgment, the creditor has a
range of post-judgment remedies available against the debtor,
such as execution on the debtor’s assets as necessary to satisfy
the judgment.
Debtors are not left without protection in the collection
process. Various federal and state laws have been enacted to
protect debtors from overreaching and engaging in abusive
tactics in attempts to collect debts. Examples of federal law
include the Fair Credit Reporting Act159 and the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.160 Many states have enacted their own
versions of those laws, as well as deceptive trade practices and
other consumer protection legislation.161
All jurisdictions have enacted exemption laws to protect
certain property of a debtor from the execution process with
respect to a judgment. The basic purpose of exemption laws is
that creditors cannot “leave the debtor with so little property
that the debtor and the debtor’s family will become a charge on
the community.”162 However, the exemption laws enacted by the
various states display a wide range of protection granted to
debtors, with some states affording debtors very minimal
protection, while others are quite generous with regard to the
amount of property that debtors can exempt. Texas is a prime
example of a state that affords substantial protection to debtors
through its homestead exemption with no dollar limit and its
generous protection of a wide range of personal property.163
Undoubtedly, the greatest protection afforded to debtors in
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2009).
160. Id. at § 1692 et seq. (2009).
161. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.01-17.926 (West 2011).
162. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS 79 (7th ed. Wolters
Kluwer Law & Bus. 2014).
163. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 et seq. (West 2006).
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the collection process is the federal bankruptcy law.164
Individual debtors filing for bankruptcy protection generally
have a choice between a liquidation or reorganization
proceeding.165 Liquidation involves disposition of all the debtor’s
nonexempt assets by a trustee appointed to represent the
bankruptcy estate and distribution of the proceeds to
creditors.166 In a reorganization bankruptcy, the debtor retains
all assets and proposes a plan to the court regarding payment of
some portion of his debts over a period of time.167 In both types
of proceedings, however, any debts remaining unpaid at the
end of the case are discharged,168 and a permanent injunction
is imposed preventing collection of those debts in the future.169
B. Fraudulent Transfer Law
1.

History

For as long as there have existed debtors and creditors,
debtors have attempted at times to avoid paying their debts. A
common avoidance technique has been to transfer nonexempt
assets to friends and family members to prevent creditors from
executing on those assets to satisfy a judgment. The law has
long attempted to prevent debtors from engaging in such
transfers for the purpose of defrauding their creditors.
Fraudulent transfer doctrines developed under Roman law,
which were used as a basis for English common law as early as
1571 in Elizabethan England.170 The English common law then
served as the basis for American fraudulent transfer doctrine.171
164. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2016).
165. See generally id. §§ 701–84 (governing liquidation bankruptcy); id.
§§ 1301–30 (governing reorganization bankruptcies for individual debtors.).
166. See generally id. §§ 701–84.
167. See generally id. §§ 1301–30.
168. See generally id. § 727, 1328.
169. See generally id. § 524.
170. See Kenneth C. Kettering, The Uniform Voidable Transactions Act;
or, the 2014 Amendments to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 70 BUS.
LAW. 777, 778 (2015) (explaining that fraudulent transfer “was elaborately
developed in Roman law, and English common law borrowed from that
source”).
171. See id. (stating that “the English Statute of 13 Elizabeth,” enacted
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All jurisdictions in the United States have enacted
fraudulent transfer laws. The first important codification of
fraudulent transfer law in America was the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act (“UFCA”), which was promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(“NCCUSL”) in 1918, and which remains current law in
Maryland and New York.172 In 1984, NCCUSL modernized and
updated the uniform law by promulgating the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”).173 As of 2014, the UFTA had
been enacted in forty-five jurisdictions and is currently the
prevailing fraudulent transfer law in the United States.174 Five
other jurisdictions have enacted fraudulent transfer laws other
than the UFCA and the UFTA.175
In 2014, NCCUSL
promulgated amendments to the UFTA, renaming the UFTA as
the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (“UVTA”).176 These
amendments were relatively minor in nature.177 Because the
UFTA currently remains as the prevailing fraudulent transfer
in the United States, it will be used for purposes of discussion
and analysis of the issues discussed in this Article.
2.

General Description of UFTA

The basic purpose of the UFTA is to provide a cause of action
and specific remedies to creditors when debtors make certain
transfers of property that are defined under the UFTA as
fraudulent.178 Those remedies include avoidance of the transfer
to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim;179

in 1571, “is traditionally referred to as the fountainhead of American law on
the subject” (citation omitted)).
172. See id. at 779.
173. See id.
174. See id. at n.11 (noting that these forty-five jurisdictions include
forty-three states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands).
175. See id. (listing these states as Alaska, Kentucky, Louisiana, South
Carolina, and Virginia).
176. See Kettering, supra, note 170, at 779.
177. See id. at 779–80 (stating that “the substantive changes made by the
amendments, though significant enough to warrant attention, are . . . light”).
178. See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act §§ 7, 8 (1984).
179. See id. § 7(a)(1).
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attachment against the property transferred;180 execution by
levy on the property transferred if the creditor has obtained a
judgment against the debtor and the court so orders; and
recovery of a judgment against certain transferees for the value
of the property transferred.181
A transfer is defined as “every mode, direct or indirect,
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of
or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes
payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other
encumbrance.”182 An asset is defined as property of a debtor, but
does not include:
(i) [P]roperty to the extent it is encumbered by a
valid lien; (ii) property to the extent it is generally
exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or (iii) an
interest in property held in tenancy by the
entireties to the extent it is not subject to process
by a creditor holding a claim against only one
tenant.183
Property is defined as “anything that may be the subject of
ownership.”184 A transfer is fraudulent as to a creditor if it is
described in either Section 4 or Section 5 of the UFTA.185 Section
4 applies “whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the
transfer was made,” and makes the transfer fraudulent if the
debtor made the transfer:
(1) [w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
any creditor of the debtor; or (2) [w]ithout
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the
debtor: (i) [w]as engaged or was about to engage
in a business or a transaction for which the
remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/6
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See id. § 8(b).
Id. § 1(12).
Id. § 1(2).
Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 1(10) (1984).
See id. §§ 4, 5.
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small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) [i]ntended to incur, or believed or reasonably
should have believed, that he [or she] would incur,
debts beyond his [or her] ability to pay as they
became due.186
Section 4(b) provides a list of factors that may be considered
in determining actual intent under Section 4(a)(1).
Section 5 applies only to creditors “whose claim arose before
the transfer was made.”187 Section 5(a) makes the transfer
fraudulent “if the debtor made the transfer . . . without receiving
a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or
obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the
debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or
obligation.”188 A debtor is insolvent by definition “if the sum of
the debtor’s debts is greater than all of the debtor’s assets at a
fair valuation.”189 For purposes of determining whether a debtor
is insolvent, assets that have been “transferred, concealed, or
removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or that
[have] been transferred in a manner making the transfer
voidable under this [Act]” are not included in the calculation.190
Also not included in the calculation are debts “to the extent [they
are] secured by a valid lien on property of the debtor.”191 A
debtor “who is generally not paying his [or her] debts as they
become due is presumed to be insolvent.”192
The term reasonably equivalent value is not defined in the
UFTA. Section 3(b), however, provides a safe harbor for certain
transfers, stating that:
[A] person gives a reasonably equivalent value if
the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an
asset pursuant to a regularly conducted,
186. Id. § 4(a).
187. Id. § 5(a).
188. Id. § 5(a), (b) (making fraudulent certain preferential transfers to
creditors).
189. Id. § 2(a).
190. Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 2(d) (1984).
191. Id. § 2(e).
192. Id. § 2(b).
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noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution of a
power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of
the interest of the debtor upon default under a
mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement.193
The UFTA applies to a division of property in a divorce only
if such a division constitutes a transfer of an asset, as those terms
are defined in the UFTA. Transfers of assets routinely occur in
a divorce in common law property jurisdictions, because all
property owned at divorce is the property of one of the spouses,
or both spouses if it is jointly owned. Division of the marital
property necessarily requires the parties or the court to transfer
property interests from one spouse to the other. In community
property jurisdictions, it is the community property estate that
is divided upon divorce. In all community property jurisdictions,
the spouses are treated as co-owners of the community property
owned during marriage; the spouses’ interests in community
property are, at least in some respects, similar to a tenancy in
common.194
Division of community property at divorce
effectuates a partition of the spouses’ co-ownership interests in
the property.195 As a consequence, division of community
property at divorce, as in common law property jurisdictions,
necessarily requires the parties or the court to transfer property
interests from one spouse to the other.
It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which
divorcing spouses who voluntarily divide their marital property
pursuant to a property settlement agreement could do so with
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor, and thus
run afoul of Section 4(a)(1) of the UFTA.196 In any situation
193. Id. § 3(b).
194. See generally REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 18
(stating that the “equality of the interests of spouses is a fundamental principle
of community property law which all community property jurisdictions now
recognize”). The analogy of community property ownership to a tenancy in
common is not entirely accurate, but the conceptual relationship is clearly
present. Id. at 22 (stating “[s]ome of the rules applicable to co-ownership
between unmarried persons do not apply to community co-ownership”).
195. See generally id. at 350–53 (discussing the methodologies adopted
by the various community property jurisdictions for dividing the community
property estate, and the effect of such a division as a partition of the
community property).
196. See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 4(a)(1) (1984).
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where one spouse is solely liable for a large debt, the spouses
could obtain a collusive divorce for the purpose of awarding the
nonexempt assets to the non-debtor spouse, thereby preventing
the creditor from attaching those assets to satisfy a judgment
against the debtor spouse. It is extremely difficult to imagine
how that could occur in cases where the trial court divides the
marital property at the conclusion of a contested trial. The
constructive fraud provisions of the UFTA in Sections 4(a)(2) 197
and 5,198 however, could result in a division of property being
treated as a fraudulent transfer in either situation.
A
determining factor pursuant to those sections would be whether
the debtor spouse received a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for the property awarded to the non-debtor spouse.
Again, it is easy to imagine how that could occur when the
divorcing spouses voluntarily divide their marital property
pursuant to a property settlement agreement; however, it could
also easily occur in situations where the trial court divides the
marital property in jurisdictions that do not require an equal
division of marital property in a divorce.199
In Texas, for example, the trial court is required to divide
the community property estate in a manner that the court deems
just and right.200 The trial court is given extremely wide
discretion in making that division, and has made it clear that
the division is not required to be equal.201 There are a large
range of factors that the court is allowed to consider in exercising
its discretion, including fault in the breakup of the marriage,
disparity in earning capacity, and many others.202 In cases
where one spouse has engaged in particularly egregious
behavior during the marriage that led to the divorce, courts have
awarded very large portions of the community property to the

197. See id. § 4(a)(2).
198. See id. § 5.
199. See generally REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 350–
51 (describing rules in the community property jurisdictions for dividing
community property at divorce and noting that some community property
jurisdictions require an equal division of community property at divorce while
others do not).
200. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001 (West 2006).
201. See Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698–99 (Tex. 1981).
202. Id.
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aggrieved spouse.203 Division of the community property estate
in these cases has often resulted in the spouse awarded little or
no community property in the divorce receiving less than
reasonably equivalent value for the community property
transferred to the aggrieved spouse. Assuming that spouse has
debts that existed at the time of the divorce for which only that
spouse is personally liable, those creditors have a potential claim
under Sections 4(a)(2)204 or 5205 of the UFTA.
At first glance, it would seem that applying the constructive
fraud provisions of the UFTA in cases where the trial court
orders an unequal division of marital property in a divorce is
inconsistent with the statutory authority to make that unequal
division of marital property. For example, in Texas, the trial
court has wide discretion to make an unequal division of
community property in a divorce; but application of the
constructive fraud provisions of the UFTA would then allow a
creditor to bring an action against a non-liable spouse
subsequent to the divorce and recover property, or its value, if
the liable spouse received less than reasonably equivalent value
in the divorce for the community property transferred to the nonliable spouse. However, application of the constructive fraud
provisions of the UFTA in that situation would be no more
inconsistent with the statutory authority in Texas to make an
unequal division of marital property in a divorce than are the
current rules which allow a creditor to attach nonexempt
property of a non-liable spouse after divorce to the same extent
the creditor could have done so during the marriage, as
discussed in Part III(D) of this Article.
3.

Jurisdictions Applying the UFTA to Division of
Marital Property in Divorce Proceedings

There are not a great number of courts that have directly
addressed the issue of whether the UFTA applies to a division of
203. See Morrison v. Morrison, 713 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex. App. 1986)
(trial court awarded 83.5% of the community property estate to wife due to
husband’s “alcoholism, adultery, and diversion of community assets for the
benefit of other women”).
204. See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 4(a)(2) (1984).
205. See id. § 5.
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marital property in a divorce proceeding; but those that have
done so have held uniformly that the UFTA does, in fact, apply.
Michigan is a good example of a common law jurisdiction
where this issue has been thoroughly addressed and resolved.206
In Estes v. Titus,207 the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the
UFTA applies to a division of marital property in a divorce
judgment that incorporates a property settlement agreement.208
In that case, Jeff Titus (“Husband”) was convicted of murder and
sued for wrongful death by the decedent’s wife, Estes
(“Decedent’s Wife”).209 While that suit was pending, Husband
was sued for divorce by his wife, Julie Swabash (“Wife”).210 In
the divorce action, Husband and Wife agreed to unequally divide
the marital property pursuant to a property settlement
agreement, with the Wife receiving nearly all the marital
property, on the ground that Husband was serving a life
sentence in prison as a result of his murder conviction.211 The
day following the entry of the divorce judgment, Decedent’s Wife
sought to intervene in the divorce action and challenged the
distribution of assets to Husband, contending that the property
settlement agreement constituted a fraudulent transfer under
the UFTA.212
206. See Citizens State Bank Norwood Young Am. v. Brown, 849 N.W.2d
55, 61 (Minn. 2014) (holding that a transfer made pursuant to an uncontested
marital dissolution decree may be set aside as fraudulent under the UFTA, but
reserving opinion as to whether the UFTA applies to contested marital
dissolution decrees); Dowell v. Dennis, 998 P.2d 206, 209, 212–13 (Okla. Civ.
App. 1999) (holding that a creditor may collaterally attack a divorce decree as
a fraudulent transfer under the UFTA); Greeninger v. Cromwell, 915 P.2d 479,
482 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a division of property pursuant to a
divorce decree may constitute a fraudulent transfer under the UFTA); see also
Canty v. Otto, 41 A.3d 280, 289–92 (Conn. 2012) (concluding, after an extensive
analysis, that the UFTA applies to property distributions pursuant to a divorce
judgment, regardless of whether the distribution is made by the parties
pursuant to a property settlement agreement or by the court at the conclusion
of a trial and referencing bankruptcy court decisions which held that the
distribution of marital assets in a dissolution decree is a transfer for purposes
of the federal Bankruptcy Code and noted that the definition of transfer in the
Bankruptcy Code is similar to that in the UFTA).
207. See generally 751 N.W.2d 493 (Mich. 2008).
208. Id. at 503.
209. Id. at 495.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 495–96.
212. Id. at 496.
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The Court noted that the UFTA applies to any transfer of an
asset, as those terms are defined in the UFTA, quoting the
UFTA’s definition of transfer as “every mode, direct or indirect,
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing
of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and
includes payment of money, release, and creation of a lien or
other encumbrance.”213 The Court then explained that a
distribution of property made by a court in a divorce judgment
“has the same effect as a deed or a bill of sale . . . effectuat[ing]
a transfer for purposes of the UFTA when the divorce judgment
enters.”214 Thus, “property transferred pursuant to a property
settlement agreement incorporated in a divorce judgment is
subject to a UFTA action if it meets the definition of an asset.”215
At this point, California is the only community property
jurisdiction that has directly addressed the issue of whether the
UFTA applies to a division of marital property in a divorce
proceeding. In Mejia v. Reed, the Supreme Court of California
held that the UFTA applies to a division of marital property in
a divorce judgment that incorporates a property settlement
agreement.216 In that case, Danilo Reed (“Husband”) had an
extramarital affair that resulted in the birth of a child.217
Husband’s wife, Violeta Reed (“Wife”), and Husband
subsequently divorced, pursuant to which Husband and Wife
agreed to a property settlement agreement providing for the
transfer of Husband’s interest to Wife in certain jointly held real
property.218 Prior to the divorce, Husband’s former mistress,
Rhina Mejia (“Mistress”), filed a paternity action against
Husband and requested child support.219 After the divorce
decree was finalized, Mistress filed an action claiming that the
property settlement agreement was a fraudulent transfer by
Husband to Wife to prevent Mistress from collecting child
support, and alleged that Husband executed the property
settlement agreement with the actual intent to defraud
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
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Estes, 751 N.W.2d at 497.
Id.
Id.
See generally 74 P.3d 166 (Cal. 2003).
Id. at 168.
Id.
Id. at 169.
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Mistress.220 One of the primary issues on appeal was whether a
transfer of property pursuant to a property settlement
agreement in a divorce action could be held invalid under the
UFTA.221
The Court began its analysis by discussing the statutory
tension between the UFTA and California’s family code
provisions that protect property transferred to a spouse in a
divorce proceeding from debts for which only the other spouse is
liable.222 The Supreme Court of California stated that its task
was to harmonize those two statutory schemes.223 The Court’s
analysis regarding application of the UFTA to a transfer of
property pursuant to a property settlement agreement in a
divorce action was consistent with the Supreme Court of
Michigan’s analysis of that issue in Estes.224 The UFTA applies
to any transfer of an asset, as those terms are defined in the
UFTA, and a distribution of property made by a court in a
divorce judgment pursuant to a property settlement agreement
is a transfer of an asset under those definitions.225 Thus, the
Court held that the UFTA applies to a division of marital
property in a divorce judgment that incorporates a property
settlement agreement.226
The Court then turned to the family code provisions dealing
with the protection of property transferred to a spouse in a
divorce from debts for which only the other spouse is liable. The
Court referred to Section 916 of the Family Code, which provides
that property received by a spouse in a divorce is exempt from
debts incurred by the other spouse before or during marriage,
and such spouse is not personally liable for those debts unless
they are assigned for payment to such spouse in the divorce.227
The Court then described the legislative history of the
predecessor statute to Section 916, stating that the legislature
enacted this statute after determining that it is usually unwise
220. Id.
221. Id. at 168.
222. Mejia v. Reed, 74 P.3d 166, 169–70 (Cal. 2003); see also supra Part
III(B) (explaining these family code provisions).
223. Mejia, 74 P.3d at 170.
224. Compare id., with Estes v. Titus, 751 N.W.2d 493 (Mich. 2008).
225. Mejia, 74 P.3d at 170.
226. Id. at 174.
227. Id. at 171.
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to continue, after divorce, the liability of spouses for community
debts incurred solely by former spouses.228 The Court also noted
that, in enacting that statute, the legislature contemplated that
a divorce court should take the rights of creditors into account
in allocating debts to the parties by assuring “there will be
available sufficient property to satisfy the debt by the person to
whom the debt is assigned, provided the net division is equal.”229
The Court cited to Section 2550 of the Family Code, providing
that the trial court must divide the community property estate
of the parties equally, unless the parties agree otherwise in
writing or by oral stipulation in open court, but there is no
requirement that parties divide the community property equally
in a property settlement agreement or that the court scrutinize
the agreement to ensure an equal division.230 Moreover, Section
916 is silent with regard to fraudulent transfers.231
Thus, the two statutory schemes are facially inconsistent.
The Family Code protects property transferred to a spouse in a
divorce proceeding from debts for which only the other spouse is
liable, so long as the debt is not assigned for payment to such
spouse in the divorce. However, the UFTA allows a creditor to
bring an action against a non-liable spouse subsequent to the
divorce and recover property, or its value, if the division of
marital property pursuant to the divorce is fraudulent under the
UFTA. The Court approached its task of harmonizing the two
statutory schemes by way of a policy analysis. It explained that
a division of community property by the court in the absence of
agreement of the parties must be done equally, and that
requirement provides some protection for a creditor of only one
spouse.232 For that reason, and because of the legislature’s
interest in protecting the rights of creditors, the Court opined
that “it is unlikely that the Legislature intended to grant
married couples a one-time-only opportunity to defraud
creditors by including the fraudulent transfer in” a property
settlement agreement.233 As a result, Section 916 must be
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
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Id.
Id. at 171–72.
Mejia, 74 P.3d at 172.
Id. at 173.
Id.
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interpreted to mean that property received by a spouse in a
divorce is exempt from debts incurred by the other spouse before
or during marriage, and such spouse is not personally liable for
those debts, unless they are assigned for payment to such
spouse in the divorce, and except in cases where the division of
marital property pursuant to the divorce is fraudulent under the
UFTA. Stated more simply, the UFTA applies to a division of
marital property in a divorce judgment that incorporates a
property settlement agreement.234
The Court, noting that the Appellate Court found triable
issues of fact with regard to both actual and constructive fraud,
then turned to the question of whether there existed a triable
issue of fact under the UFTA as to constructive fraud.235 The
Court determined that whether Husband received reasonably
equivalent value in the division of property pursuant to the
property settlement agreement was a material disputed fact.236
However, the Court noted that constructive fraud under Section
5 of the UFTA requires proof that “the transferor was insolvent
at the time of the transfer, or rendered insolvent by the
transfer,” and determined that there was “no triable issue of fact
on the question of insolvency.”237
Idaho, a community property jurisdiction, has not directly
addressed the issue of whether the UFTA applies to a division of
marital property in a divorce proceeding, but has taken an
approach that is at least conceptually similar to application of
portions of the UFTA. As discussed in Part III(A) of this Article,
in Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. Holley,238 the Supreme Court
of Idaho applied debtor-creditor principles to the issue of
whether a creditor is allowed to obtain a post-divorce judgment
against a spouse who is not personally liable for a debt incurred
solely by the other spouse, either before or during the marriage,
and attach nonexempt property received by the non-liable
spouse in the divorce. The Court held that “a creditor may not,
with one exception, proceed against community assets
distributed to [a spouse] pursuant to a divorce decree” if that
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 174.
Id.
Id.
Mejia, 74 P.3d at 174.
See generally 723 P.2d 893 (Idaho 1986).
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spouse is not personally liable for the obligation to that
creditor.239 The Court cited to an earlier case, Spokane
Merchants’ Ass’n v. Olmstead,240 for the exception: in a divorce,
when only one spouse is personally liable for an obligation
incurred during the marriage, “but is not awarded sufficient
community assets to satisfy such a debt, a creditor may properly
seek satisfaction for the debt from community property
distributed to the other spouse.”241 The Court explained that the
purpose for the exception is to prevent spouses from utilizing
“divorce proceedings to perpetrate a fraud on creditors of the
community.”242 These rules bear at least some resemblance to
the constructive fraud provisions of the UFTA in Sections
4(a)(2)243 and 5.244
C. Policy Considerations
The basic issue addressed by this Article is to what extent a
creditor is allowed to obtain a judgment after divorce against a
spouse who is not personally liable for a debt, which has been
incurred solely by the other spouse, either before or during the
marriage. Accordingly, the question is to what extent is a
creditor allowed to attach nonexempt property either received by
the non-liable spouse in the divorce or subsequently acquired by
such spouse. As discussed earlier in this Article, the rules
adopted in most of the community property jurisdictions with
respect to this issue appear to be primarily focused on the
perspective of marital property and family law without regard to
general debtor-creditor law principles and policies. For example,
basic fraudulent transfer law has been ignored in those
jurisdictions and not applied in the usual manner. As a result,
the rules developed in those jurisdictions with regard to the postdivorce liability issue are not consistent with the basic principles
and policies of debtor-creditor law. This Section will explore
239. Id. at 897.
240. See generally 327 P.2d 385 (Idaho 1958).
241. Twin Falls Bank, 723 P.2d at 897 (citing Spokane Merchants Ass’n,
327 P.2d 385).
242. Id. (citing Spokane Merchants Ass’n, 327 P.2d 385).
243. See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 4(a)(2) (1984).
244. See id. § 5.
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whether valid policy reasons exist for treating creditors
differently in this context than creditors in other situations.
The basic right of any creditor is to be paid the full amount
they are owed according to the terms and conditions established
at the time the obligation is created, either by agreement of the
parties or applicable rules of law. If the obligation is created by
contractual agreement, the creditor has the ability to evaluate
the level of risk that it desires to assume, or even whether to
extend credit at all. The creditor has the ability to acquire a
substantial amount of information with regard to its debtor. The
creditor can obtain the debtor’s permission to conduct a credit
investigation by the use of credit reporting agencies and
determine the debtor’s credit score. The creditor certainly can
determine whether its debtor is married or single. If the debtor
is married, the creditor can demand that the debtor’s spouse
agree to become jointly liable for the obligation. However, if the
debtor owns unencumbered assets, then the creditor can further
protect itself by acquiring security interests in those assets to
secure the obligation.245
Unsecured creditors are generally disfavored under the law
and have few rights compared to secured creditors.246 As
discussed earlier in this Article, creditors generally have the
right in all jurisdictions to bring a legal cause of action and
obtain a judgment against a debtor who is personally liable for
an obligation and who has defaulted on payment of such
obligation. If the debtor subsequently declines to pay the
judgment, the creditor has a range of post-judgment remedies
available against the debtor, such as execution on the debtor’s
assets as necessary to satisfy the judgment. If a creditor who
has not yet obtained a judgment is concerned or actually
suspects that the debtor will transfer nonexempt assets to avoid
satisfaction of any judgment ultimately acquired by the creditor,
pre-judgment attachment remedies are available, subject to

245. See generally Paulsen, supra note 9, at 835–37 (discussing rights of
creditors and their ability to protect themselves when extending credit).
246. See generally WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 164, at 40–44, 131–
36 (explaining that the rights of secured creditors are vastly superior to the
rights of unsecured creditors, and the superior rights of the secured creditor
compared to the minimal rights of the unsecured creditor is a paradigm that
extends into federal bankruptcy law).
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certain procedural and constitutional safeguards.247
All
creditors assume a risk that, subject to application of a
jurisdiction’s fraudulent transfer law, a debtor will dispose of or
otherwise dissipate his nonexempt assets that would be
normally available to a creditor in the post-judgment execution
process.248 This could occur whether the debtor is single or
married. However, if a debtor is married and his spouse is not
personally liable for the obligation, the debtor has the added
ability to transfer nonexempt assets to his spouse, thus making
them unavailable to his creditors in a collection action.
A transfer of assets to a spouse could be accomplished in a
number of different ways, but the usual manner is by making a
gift of the assets. In community property jurisdictions, property
received by gift is characterized as separate property of the
donee spouse,249 even when the gift is made by the other spouse.
Thus, the property is placed outside of the creditor’s reach in a
collection action. The UFTA applies to such a transfer in the
same way it applies to transfers of assets outside the marriage,
thereby protecting the creditor from transfers that the UFTA
describes as fraudulent.
In community property jurisdictions, spouses have the
ability to effectively transfer community property assets by
entering into an agreement to change the character of property
from community property to separate property of one of the
spouses.250 Thus, a debtor spouse could enter into such an
agreement to make community property the separate property
of the non-debtor spouse, thereby placing such property outside
the creditor’s reach in a collection action. The extent to which
such an agreement is binding on creditors varies significantly
among the community property jurisdictions.251 In Texas, for
247. See generally id. (briefly explaining the legal process required for a
creditor to obtain pre-judgment remedies with respect to nonexempt property
of a debtor).
248. See id. at 841 (discussing risks that all creditors must assume when
extending credit).
249. See, Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.001(2) (West 2006).
250. See generally, REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 35–
43 (discussing the rules applicable in community property jurisdictions for
spouses to make express agreements concerning the characterization of
property owned during marriage).
251. See generally id. at 338–40 (discussing the rules applicable in
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example, spouses may enter into pre- and post-marital
agreements and agree to change the character of property from
community to separate, unless by doing so they intend to
defraud pre-existing creditors.252 At least one community
property jurisdiction (Arizona) has recognized that the UFTA
applies to agreements to change the character of property from
community to separate.253 In State ex rel Industrial Commission
of Arizona v. Wright,254 the Court held that an agreement
between spouses to change the character of marital property is
a transfer as that term is defined in the UFTA.255 The Court
explained that an agreement to change the character of property
constitutes the transfer of property rights from one spouse to the
other.256 Thus, the UFTA clearly applies to all transfers of
property pursuant to a pre- or post-marital property agreement,
protecting creditors from transfers that the UFTA describes as
fraudulent.
A transfer of assets can also be accomplished in any
jurisdiction by a division of marital property at divorce. As
discussed in Part IV(B) of this Article, the UFTA clearly applies
to all such transfers, thereby protecting creditors from transfers
which the UFTA describes as fraudulent. As such, any transfer
of assets from one spouse to another, however structured, is
subject to the UFTA in the same way transfers of assets by a
single person or by a married person to a non–spouse are. This
community property jurisdictions with regard to the extent to which marital
property agreements are binding on creditors). In Nevada, for example,
agreements between spouses to change the character of community property
to separate property do not affect creditors, but are binding on creditors in
Washington and California. See id. at 339. In Wisconsin, such agreements
cannot adversely affect a creditor absent such creditor’s actual knowledge of
the agreement at the time the obligation is incurred. See id. In Louisiana, such
agreements must be recorded to be effective against subsequent creditors to be
effective. See id.
252. See Paulsen, supra note 9, at 826 (explaining the constitutional and
statutory limitations with regard to pre- and post-marital property
agreements); see also TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 4.106(a) (West 2006).
253. See State ex rel. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz. v. Wright, 43 P.3d 203, 206
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that marital transmutations of community
property to separate property are subject to the UFTA).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 205–06.
256. Id. at 206.
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results in a logical consistency with respect to the rights of
creditors. Creditors should be entitled to the same protection of
their right to be paid, regardless of whether their debtor is
married or single at any point in the debtor-creditor
relationship.
So, what is the purpose for the rules adopted by some of the
community property jurisdictions—as described in Part III of
this Article—which allow creditors to attach property
transferred to the non-debtor spouse post-divorce? As discussed,
some of those jurisdictions, such as Louisiana and Texas, simply
extend the rules for liability of marital property for debts
incurred prior to or during marriage to the period after divorce.
However, other jurisdictions, such as Wisconsin and Arizona, go
even further by allowing the rights of creditors to be significantly
enhanced simply because of divorce, providing creditors with
potential windfalls.
The rules adopted by community property jurisdictions
regarding whether community property is exempt from debts
incurred solely by one spouse—as discussed in Part II of this
Article—were critically necessary for protection of creditors
during an intact marriage. If community property was exempt
from debts incurred solely by one spouse, a creditor would in
many cases not be able to collect unless it assured that both
spouses were personally liable for it. This would impose a
burden on creditors to determine that its debtor is, in fact,
married and require his or her spouse to participate in the debtcreating transaction. It would be essentially impossible for a
creditor to accomplish this in cases involving involuntary debts,
such as an obligation imposed by tort or tax law, for which
personal liability only attaches to those on whom the obligation
is imposed by law.
However, there is no conceivable purpose in extending these
rules to the period after divorce and enabling a creditor to attach
former community property which has been transferred in the
divorce to the non-debtor spouse.257 In fact, doing so creates a
257. Case law in the community property jurisdictions that extend those
rules to the period after divorce is devoid of any rationale for doing so. See,
e.g., Paulsen, supra note 9, at 815–16 (asserting that there is no “clearly
articulated rationale” provided in the Texas decisions that extend the rules
enacted to protect the rights of creditors during an intact marriage, with regard
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serious injustice with regard to a former spouse who was never
personally liable for the obligation and received the former
community property in exchange for other community property.
Furthermore, creditors do not need these rules to be extended to
the period after divorce for their rights to be adequately
protected. Creditors of single debtors, who default on their
obligations and have transferred property to others, are
protected by the UFTA. The same is true of creditors of married
debtors who default on their obligations and transfer property to
a non-spouse, or to a spouse by gift or by execution of a pre-or
post-marital agreement. There is simply no reason to provide
even greater protection than that provided by the UFTA to
creditors of married debtors who transfer property in their
divorce to former spouses.
Furthermore, it defies logic to extend community property
rules, which were enacted to protect the rights of creditors
during an intact marriage, to the period after divorce. These
rules are directed at the rights of creditors to seize marital
community property.
Divorced parties no longer have
community property because all community property has been
partitioned by agreement or court order upon their divorce, and
any community property not partitioned is held by the former
spouses jointly as tenants in common.258
D. Proposal
The basic issue addressed by this Article is to what extent a
creditor is allowed to obtain a judgment after divorce against a
spouse who is not personally liable for a debt, which has been
incurred solely by the other spouse, either before or during the
marriage. Accordingly, it must be determined to what extent
such a creditor is allowed to attach nonexempt property either
received by the non-liable spouse in the divorce or subsequently
acquired by such spouse. As discussed, community property
jurisdictions should adopt rules to ensure that: (1) spouses who
are not personally liable for debts owed at the time of divorce are

to community property, to the period after divorce).
258. See id. at 830–31 (explaining that there is no community property
that continues to exist after a divorce).
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not unfairly deprived of community property that is transferred
to them in the divorce; (2) rights of creditors are protected in a
way that is consistent with the rights of creditors in any other
situation; and (3) family law and debtor-creditor law are both
applied consistently and fairly pursuant to the purposes for
which such law was originally enacted. California embodies a
community property jurisdiction that has adopted rules most
closely accomplishing these objectives. As discussed in Part
III(B) of this Article, a California statute provides that property
received by a spouse in a divorce is exempt from debts incurred
by the other spouse before or during marriage, and such spouse
is not personally liable for those debts, unless such a debt is
assigned for payment to such spouse in the divorce. In addition,
as discussed in Part IV(B)(3) of this Article, case law in
California makes it abundantly clear that the UFTA applies to
a division of marital property in a divorce judgment. All
community property jurisdictions should follow California’s lead
and adopt rules providing that property received in a divorce is
exempt from debts incurred solely by the other spouse before or
during marriage, with the only exception being to the extent that
fraudulent transfer law applies to the division of the marital
property in the divorce proceeding.
V. Conclusion
The primary thrust of this Article is to address an issue that
creditors face when seeking a judgment from a divorcee not
personally liable for a debt. The rules developed by each of the
community property jurisdictions with respect to this issue are
quite distinct and were discussed separately for each jurisdiction
in Part III. Some jurisdictions have adopted rules that are quite
restrictive with regard to the rights of creditors; the rules in
other jurisdictions are quite favorable to creditors, resulting in
significant enhancement of the rights of creditors in some
jurisdictions, and potential windfalls to creditors, simply
because of the divorce.
The rules adopted in most of the community property
jurisdictions with respect to this issue appear to be primarily
focused on the perspective of marital property and family law
without regard to general debtor-creditor law principles and
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policies. For example, fraudulent transfer law has been ignored
in those jurisdictions and not applied in the usual manner. As a
result, the rules developed in those jurisdictions with regard to
the post-divorce liability issue are not consistent with the basic
principles and policies of debtor-creditor law. Part IV of this
Article discussed basic debtor-creditor law as it relates to this
issue. In particular, Part IV(B) described fraudulent transfer
law under the UFTA and discussed its application to a division
of marital property in a divorce proceeding, concluding that the
UFTA does in fact apply.
Part IV(C) discussed policy considerations regarding the
rights of creditors, and concluded that there is no conceivable
purpose in extending the rules that were enacted to protect the
rights of creditors during an intact marriage, with regard to
community property, to the period after divorce. In fact, doing
so creates a serious injustice with regard to a non-debtor former
spouse. Furthermore, creditors do not need those rules to be
extended to the period after divorce for their rights to be
adequately protected because they are already protected by the
UFTA. There simply is no reason to provide creditors of married
debtors who obtain a divorce and transfer property in the divorce
to their former spouses with any greater protection than any
other creditor is afforded.
As a result, all community property jurisdictions should
provide that property received in a divorce is exempt from debts
incurred solely by the other spouse before or during marriage,
except to the extent that fraudulent transfer law applies to the
division of the marital property in the divorce proceeding. This
will ensure that spouses who are not personally liable for debts
owed at the time of divorce are treated fairly after the divorce is
finalized, rights of creditors are protected in a way that is
consistent with the rights of creditors in any other situation, and
family law and debtor-creditor law are both applied consistently
and fairly.
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